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ABSTRACT
BRIT KIMBERLY ERSLEV: Controversy and Crusade: Daniel Harvey Hill and the
Shaping of Reputation and Historical Memory
(Under the direction of Joseph T. Glatthaar)
Between 1863 and 1889, Confederate Major General Daniel Harvey Hill defended
himself against real and perceived attacks on his reputation in connection with the Lost
Dispatch and the Battle of Chickamauga, two controversial events of the Civil War. As a
crusader of sorts, Hill actively shaped the historical memory of the Civil War in part by
aggressively pursuing personal vindication through correspondence with politicians and
colleagues and through printed statements in his own and other publications. Hill connected
criticism of his military reputation with that of his personal reputation, and vice versa. For
Hill, these two sides of his reputation were intimately linked by the desire to uphold the
family name, not only for his children, but in relation to his war record and the units he
commanded. He was keenly aware of his potential role in the memory-making of the war
because he was one of its architects. Therefore, he consciously made the struggle to clear his
reputation part of his crusade to sculpt southern and national memory of the Civil War.
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PROLOGUE: THE CRUSADER AT WORK
In early 1868, former Confederate Major General Daniel Harvey Hill wrote an
emotional article for his self-published monthly magazine, The Land We Love. A friend had
recently brought to his attention an excerpt from Virginia newspaper editor Edward A.
Pollard’s The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates. Pollard
became famous throughout the former Confederate states for this book and other works on
the late war.1 He described an incident in September 1862 in which a copy of an order from
General Robert E. Lee was delivered to Hill, then a division commander in Lee’s Army of
Northern Virginia. When Hill received the order, Pollard claimed, “this vain and petulant
officer, in a moment of passion, had thrown the paper on the ground. It was picked up by a
Federal soldier, and [Union General George] McClellan thus strangely became possessed of
the exact detail of his adversary’s plan of operations.”2
Hill’s article passionately rebutted Pollard’s accusation. After arguing that Civil War
histories should be written by his generation’s descendants, Hill denied ever receiving the
order from Lee’s headquarters. He said he had first heard of his name being connected by
some “pen-and-ink warriors” to the “Lost Dispatch” in June 1863. “As part of Mr. E. A.
Pollard’s history was written during the war,” Hill observed, “it may be that while I was
1 Alan T. Nolan, “The Anatomy of the Myth,” in The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History, ed. Gary
W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 13, and Rollin G. Osterweis,
The Myth of the Lost Cause, 1865-1900 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1973), 11-15.
2 Edward A. Pollard, The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates (New York: E.B.
Treat and Co., Publishers, 1868), 314.
2risking my life for the defence of Richmond he, secure in his office, was penning this most
unjust and unprovoked slander.”3 He continued, “It does seem a little vain for a man, who
never saw a single battle-field to attempt to describe so many hundreds of battles, and tell
what were the errors in the conduct of them all . . . In fact, I think that it would be great
presumption in Mr. E. A. Pollard to criticise the military career of one of Lee’s corporals or
drummer boys.”4 Near the end of his article, Hill declared, “I am not willing that my
reputation should be blackened and my name made odious among my countrymen, through
the malice and unfairness of one, who encountered no dangers, endured no hardships and
suffered no privations for that “Lost Cause,” of which he so presumptuously claims to be the
historian.”5
Hill’s attempts to refute Pollard’s charges reflected his sensitivity to how his personal
honor and reputation were being represented in the present and how they would appear in the
future historical record of the Civil War. Likewise, he wanted to discredit Pollard as a biased
historian who, if he could not get the facts straight about Hill and his troops, could not be
expected to fairly represent the larger narrative of the southern war cause. By virtue of his
service in the Confederate armies, Hill felt imminently more qualified to comment on and
shape the narrative of the war than Pollard. Although many southerners recognized Pollard’s
weaknesses as a historian, by 1868 he had, through his numerous publications, already
contributed to the construction of the region’s collective memory of the war. During these
same turbulent post-war years and up until his death in September 1889, Hill became one of
3 D.H. Hill, “The Lost Dispatch,” The Land We Love 4, No. 4 (Feb., 1868): 275. As with Civil War battles,
there are two different names for this incident: southerners called it “The Lost Dispatch” while northerners
called it “The Lost Order.” Historians use both interchangeably.
4 Ibid., 278-79.
5 Ibid., 284.
3a handful of Confederate veterans who self-consciously took over from Pollard the shaping
of what they felt was a more accurate collective, and in particular historical memory, that
would vindicate their efforts in the late war. Even with his eye on the big picture, however,
Hill took the fight for southern memory personally. The second part of Hill’s Civil War was
a war of words over his reputation.
CHAPTER 1
D.H. HILL, THE LOST CAUSE, AND HISTORICAL MEMORY
Explanations of collective and historical memory retain a certain fuzziness even after
thirty years of renewed interest in the study of memory. Scholars continue to refine Maurice
Halbwachs’ definition of collective memory, which, as Jeffrey Olick explains, was
dichotomous: he allowed for “socially framed individual memories and collective
commemorative representations and mnemonic traces.”6 In other words, individual
memories reconstructed according to social stimuli exist alongside an overarching collective
memory, or more accurately, the memory of several mnemonic communities.7 Halbwachs,
however, did not fully explore the connections between the collective and the individual.
I think of collective memory in similarly broad terms to Halbwachs, but agree with
Olick that the trauma of an event such as the Civil War both highlights and links individual
and collective responses, and brings them into dialogue with each other (as well as making
individual traumas part of the national narrative).8 The way ex-Confederates framed the
memory of the war had implications for how they presented its history. John Nerone has
commented that history is characterized by multiplicity, yielding “many truths but no Truth,”
6 Jeffrey K. Olick, “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures,” Sociological Theory 17, No. 3 (Nov. 1999): 334-
36.
7 Eviatar Zerubavel, “Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past,” Qualitative Sociology 19, No. 3
(1996): 289-91.
8 Olick, “Collective Memory,” 344-46.
5resulting in a clash with social (collective) memory, which is itself contested.9 In late
nineteenth-century America, before the professionalization of history, southern veterans
retained public authority over the historical memory of the Civil War. Essentially, unlike
scholars today, they thought of history and memory as the same thing; the veterans sought to
vindicate “the truth of Confederate history” as they saw it.10 Ex-Confederates crafted
historical memory, through the use of history and historical records, as a way to reconcile the
experiences of individuals and groups through a broad narrative that achieved an accepted
degree of credibility for the greater collective audience.11 In this sense, Hill and others
constructed particular historical memories—through dialogue and debate in print and
speech—within a larger framework of collective memory about the Civil War. These
historical memories were not only highly contested within the veteran group, they were in
turn questioned and condoned by their audience. Personal grievances did not remain private
for long, and together with controversial events provided fodder for public judgment and a
dizzying array of perceptions about guilt and innocence. Combined with the fact of
Confederate defeat, perceptions of even minor issues assumed larger importance in the quest
to explain why the war followed its particular course.
The Lost Dispatch, a real incident that involved the compromise of one of Lee’s
important military orders, was only one of many topics discussed publicly and privately by
Confederate veterans in the decades after Appomattox as they sought to vindicate and
rationalize military defeat. According to proponents of the Lost Cause, the Confederacy
9 John Nerone, “Professional History and Social Memory,” Communication 11 (1989): 101.
10 Southern Historical Society Papers 1 (Jan 1876): 39.
11 On historical memory, see W. Fitzhugh Brundage, “Introduction: No Deed But Memory,” in Where These
Memories Grow: History, Memory, and Southern Identity, ed. W. Fitzhugh Brundage (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 5-6.
6might have lost the Civil War due to the overwhelming materiel and manpower resources of
the Northern states, but its fight for constitutional freedom and property rights (embodied in
the institution of slavery) was just and honorable. Confederate veterans took great pride in
their courage and skill on the battlefield, finding their heroes in their generals, especially
Robert E. Lee, who after his death in 1870 was elevated to white male sainthood. This
collective memory of the Lost Cause, described by Charles Wilson as a civil religion, was
sculpted by southerners to fit their particular political, social, or cultural needs in postbellum
America. The Lost Cause also provided a thin veil for the underlying anxieties of male
Southerners concerned about a loss of honor and manhood in the private and public spheres
as a result of military defeat.12
D.H. Hill, a South Carolina native and graduate of the United States Military
Academy (Class of 1842), became one of the most vocal architects of the Lost Cause. He
spent ten years as the Charlotte, North Carolina-based editor of the monthly The Land We
Love, followed by The Southern Home, a weekly newspaper he published until the end of
formal Reconstruction in 1877. He was the first North Carolina vice president of the
Southern Historical Society, founded in 1869, and contributed articles to the pages of its
journal (the Southern Historical Society Papers) that began circulation in 1876. Until two
years before his death in 1889 he was asked to deliver speeches to gatherings of Confederate
12 See Osterweis, The Myth of the Lost Cause, 1865-1900; Gallagher and Nolan, eds., The Myth of the Lost
Cause and Civil War History; Charles Reagan Wilson, Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause,
1865-1920 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980); Thomas L. Connelly and Barbara L. Bellows, God and
General Longstreet: The Lost Cause and the Southern Mind (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1982); Gaines Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, The Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American
Memory (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001); and W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The
Southern Past: A Clash of Race and Memory (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2005). Bertram Wyatt-Brown explores the connection between honor and the Lost Cause in The Shaping of
Southern Culture: Honor, Grace, and War, 1760s-1880s (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
2001). Laura Edwards provides an intriguing local study of the gendered implications of power for returning
Confederate war veterans in her Gendered Strife and Confusion: The Political Culture of Reconstruction
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997).
7veterans, extolling the virtues of soldiers and southerners. A former mathematics teacher,
Hill returned to education in 1877 as the president of the institution that would become the
University of Arkansas, and afterwards served in the same capacity at Georgia Military
College. All the while, he maintained a busy correspondence with past colleagues, friends,
admirers, and family. As an erudite scholar and participant in many of the major
engagements of the Civil War, no one was better suited to write about the conflict and his
part in it.
Unfortunately, Hill was plagued by two incidents during the war that called into
question his military competence. One could say that September was an unlucky month for
Hill. The Lost Dispatch episode of September 1862 was followed by his abrupt firing from
corps command after the Battle of Chickamauga (Georgia) in September 1863. At
Chickamauga, General Braxton Bragg, his commanding officer, associated Hill with a clique
of generals who desired Bragg’s removal. Although Hill spent the rest of the war years
searching for a reason why Confederate President Jefferson Davis relieved him from
command, it is primarily with the Lost Dispatch that Hill continues to be connected in
historical scholarship. After a successful start as the recruiter of North Carolina’s first
Confederate infantry regiment, the winner of the first land-based engagement of the war, and
as a division commander under Lee, Hill saw his military career go downhill as a result of his
association with the two above incidences.
Hill spent the remainder of his life defending himself against attacks, real or
perceived, on his reputation as connected with these two controversial events of the war. As
a crusader of sorts, he actively shaped the historical memory of the Civil War in part by
aggressively pursuing personal vindication through correspondence with politicians and
8colleagues and through printed statements in his own and other publications. Hill connected
criticism of his military reputation with that of his character reputation, and vice versa. By
military reputation, I mean tactical competence on the battlefield, attention to protocol, and
other soldiers’ trust in the leader. By character reputation, I mean a concern over honor, in
particular integrity, truthfulness, and a strong sense of right and wrong. For Hill, these two
sides of his reputation were intimately linked by the desire to uphold the family name, not
only for his children, but in relation to his war record and the units he commanded. Concern
for his name, and by extension the competency of his troops, along with a precise military
mindset, caused Hill to hone in on and clarify the details of allegations made against him.13
He was keenly aware of his potential role in the memory-making of the war because he was
one of its architects. Therefore, he consciously made the struggle to clear his reputation part
of his crusade to sculpt southern and national memory of the Civil War. Ironically, he was
simultaneously a proponent and target of the Lost Cause, and lamented the continued
publicity over his alleged wrongdoings as much as he used it to clear his name. Ultimately,
the public and peers responded favorably to his efforts, but Hill never quite let go of his fear
of having a sullied reputation. The events of Chickamauga receded in importance, especially
as history tended to single out the leadership limitations of Braxton Bragg, but Hill was truly
bothered to his death by his continued association with the Lost Dispatch, a document that
bore his name for posterity.
13 Bertram Wyatt-Brown refers to the defense of family and community as “romanticized self-respect in both
language and action”: The Shaping of Southern Culture, 194-195 & 202.
CHAPTER 2
REPUTATION STUDIES: A USEFUL FRAMEWORK
The establishment and evolution of a person’s reputation coincide with how that
individual is remembered, on their own and in conjunction with the event(s) that “made”
them. Several sociologists have studied the making of reputation as a social construction.
The subfield of reputation studies helps address the collective influence on the individual.
Two related models, in particular, are applicable to a study of Hill. Gladys and Kurt Lang, in
their book about British and American etchers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
identified two dynamics of reputation: recognition and renown. Recognition, they argue, is
driven by how “insiders,” essentially peers and discerning individuals within the artist’s
community, hold the person in esteem. Renown, on the other hand, is a measure of how well
known the artist is outside their sphere. By itself, renown may not be enough to guarantee
the survival of achievement after the artist dies. The Langs listed four factors essential for
keeping a particular reputation before the public: the artist’s own efforts to “protect or
project” their reputation; the efforts of interested parties in furthering the posthumous artistic
reputation; the artist’s association to tangible networks that would allow entry into the
“cultural archives” (i.e. school, museum, or organization) of their field; and the person’s
symbolic linkages with the political and cultural identities of the public at large.14
14 Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang, Etched in Memory: The Building and Survival of Artistic Reputation
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 6 & 318-19.
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The Langs’ theory applies well to Confederate military veterans, men who built and
dismantled the reputations of their peers and used the Southern Historical Society, United
Confederate Veterans, and other organizations to publicize their version of Civil War
memory and the particular memory of living and deceased officers. Hill consistently applied
the first factor—that of protecting and projecting his reputation—when seeking assurances
from Jefferson Davis, soliciting help from political allies, and writing multi-page rebuttals in
magazines. By virtue of his participation in the Southern Historical Society and as a
publisher and editor who celebrated both the general and common soldier while bemoaning
the policies of Radical Reconstruction, Hill solidified his access to the southern cultural
archives. As the spirit of reconciliation overtook the country in the 1880s, he could also
identify not only with the former Confederacy but with the American public through his
Century battle narratives that celebrated valor on both sides of Chickamauga Creek and
South Mountain.
Generally speaking, most people’s reputations fall within a gray area between the
extremes of “good” or “evil.” Gary Alan Fine, in his studies of the “difficult” reputations of
Benedict Arnold and Warren Harding, found that those people considered failures or
incompetents suffer from the lack of a supportive perspective. In Fine’s example of Harding,
there was no one willing to champion the positive accomplishments of his administration, so
instead he went down in history as the worst president, vaguely identified today with the
Teapot Dome Scandal. People such as Harding required what Fine called a “reputational
entrepreneur,” an advocate who through “self-interest, narrative clarity, and social position
affect which reputations ‘stick’.”15 Fine’s term is an elaboration of the Langs’ second point
15 Gary Alan Fine, “Reputational Entrepreneurs and the Memory of Incompetence: Melting Supporters, Partisan
Warriors, and Images of President Harding,” The American Journal of Sociology 101, No. 5 (Mar. 1996): 1162-
11
that interested parties must further the person’s posthumous reputation, and also of their first
point that the person in question is their own reputational entrepreneur. Hill’s posthumous
reputation is the object of future study, but while he was alive he also had reputational
entrepreneurs that assisted him by mentioning him in newspaper articles and speeches, or
more blatantly through lobbying in Richmond during the war. Hill and his entrepreneurs
were extremely successful in defending the character side of his reputation, as evidenced in
glowing postmortem tributes. Even his military competence appeared vindicated, as there
was little further mention of controversy by 1889.
Hill initially responded to allegations about the Lost Dispatch and Chickamauga
during the last two years of the war. Years before Edward Pollard’s attack, Hill made sure
that the copy of Lee’s order that he had in fact received was sent home for safekeeping
among his papers. He spent the remainder of the war trying to extract an official reason for
his dismissal after Chickamauga, an effort in which he enlisted the help of his eldest brother
and his uncle-in-law, North Carolina (Confederate) Senator William A. Graham. In
particular, Hill pressed for a statement of confidence in his service from Jefferson Davis,
even if he no longer commanded in the field, for he considered this essential for vindicating
his reputation. In spite of Graham’s pressure through the North Carolina contingent in
Congress, the Confederate president, to Hill’s chagrin, never provided the statement.
After the war, Hill actively denied his role in the loss of the dispatch and in a public
effort at sculpting historical memory, claimed the lost order was beneficial to the
Confederacy. In The Land We Love, “the acknowledged organ of the late Confederate
1163. See also his compilation of reputation studies (including this article), Difficult Reputations: Collective
Memories of the Evil, Inept, and Controversial (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).
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Army,” he strongly rebutted Pollard’s historical stance on two occasions.16 Hill also slipped
in, without comment, his and two of his subordinates’ battle reports of Chickamauga.
Former colleagues and veterans wrote him to support his stance and vilify Pollard’s history,
although Robert E. Lee privately disagreed with Hill’s interpretation of the meaningfulness
of the Lost Dispatch. Hill’s responses to Pollard illustrate Thomas Connelly’s and Barbara
Bellow’s explanation of the 1860s as the beginning of the “Inner Lost Cause” period of
writing. During the immediate post-war years, ex-Confederate authors assumed a defensive
tone over controversies and looked for others to blame while resigning themselves to
vindication in future histories.17 The Inner Lost Cause retained a sectional flavor not only
because of subject matter but because of the relative lack of circulation of southern postwar
publications in other parts of the United States.
By the 1880s, national magazines increasingly published articles by Union and
Confederate veterans and the Southern Historical Society Papers (SHSP) became firmly
established. Prompted by the publication of a Confederate veteran reunion address about
Chickamauga, the SHSP reprinted several official reports of the battle. For some reason,
Hill’s report was not among them, but this fact garnered no official reply from the general.
He did respond, however, to another ex-Confederate general who brought up the Lost
Dispatch in a subsequent issue of the SHSP, accepting a Frenchman’s account of Hill leaving
the order on a table in a Frederick, Maryland house. Still fiercely protective of his
reputation, Hill denied this account in a follow-up article, and continued to lobby for the
productiveness of the lost order. During the same decade, Hill contributed battle narratives
16 This was the endorsement of a number of ex-Confederate generals which they sent to the New Orleans Times;
Hill preprinted it in his magazine three months later. J.B. Hood, et. al., “New Orleans, December 10, 1868,”
The Land We Love 6, No. 5 (Mar. 1869): inside back cover.
17 Connelly and Bellows, God and General Longstreet, 5-7 & 57.
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to the New York-based Century magazine and corresponded with General James Longstreet
about swapping notes for their entries, lamenting that they were both being made scapegoats
for Confederate blunders. The “Inner Lost Cause” was still in play at this time, but a
“National Lost Cause”—a homogenous, white American memory of the Civil War—started
to eclipse the former through venues such as Century’s “Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War” essay series.18 In other words, a wider public than during the 1860s saw Hill’s rebuttal
in the SHSP as well as his Century articles on the Battle of South Mountain (which was
connected with the Lost Dispatch) and the Battle of Chickamauga. Hill was critical of
Braxton Bragg’s leadership in the Chickamauga piece, but did not mention the after-battle
command controversy. By contrast, the South Mountain article reiterated the advantages of
the Lost Dispatch. Hill let the Chickamauga matter go late in life, likely due to a conciliatory
correspondence with Davis, but was unable to do the same for the Lost Dispatch. The
continued mystery of who lost the order and the presence of Hill’s name on the paper meant
he was perpetually associated with the incident, causing him (and his family) anxiety about
how his reputation would be judged in the future.
18 Ibid., 44 & 46.
CHAPTER 3
TROUBLE ON THE HORIZON: THE LOST DISPATCH
As to the controversies themselves: First, how did the Lost Dispatch become Lost,
and what were the immediate military implications?19 Shortly after Robert E. Lee and his
Army of Northern Virginia defeated Union General John Pope at the Battle of Second
Manassas in late August 1862, Lee moved across the Potomac River into Maryland. During
the course of the campaign, Lee decided that he would need to secure objectives (specifically
towns such as Harpers Ferry) along his supply line back through the Shenandoah Valley of
Virginia. On September 9th, his headquarters issued Special Orders Number 191 (S.O. 191)
detailing the missions of each division in the army. Hill had recently rejoined the Army of
Northern Virginia with his division of roughly five thousand men, falling under the command
of his brother-in-law, General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, for the movement into
Maryland. Under S.O. 191, Hill’s division formed the rear guard of the army as it moved
west from Frederick to Hagerstown.20 Meanwhile, General George McClellan, in charge of
the Union Army of the Potomac, cautiously pursued Lee toward the mountains. The risk in
19 There are several histories of the Maryland Campaign of 1862. The most well known and cited are James V.
Murfin, The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and Robert E. Lee’s Maryland Campaign, September
1862 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), which was originally published in 1965, and
Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983).
Joseph Harsh, Murfin’s graduate student, recently published two books on the campaign: Taken at the Flood:
Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University
Press, 1999), and Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862
(Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2000).
20 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Ser. I, 19 (2): 603-604 (hereafter cited as OR, unless
otherwise noted all citations are from Ser. I).
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Lee’s order lay in the division of his army into five major parts that would be separated by
several square miles of water and mountainous obstacles. If McClellan moved fast enough,
he could engage these isolated units and defeat Lee’s army piece by piece.
Lee’s assistant adjutant general, Colonel Robert Chilton, prepared S.O. 191 and
directed its distribution. Copies were addressed to each major subordinate commander,
including Hill. The order detached Hill’s troops from Jackson’s command, but Jackson,
noting that the chain of command stayed intact until execution of the order, personally copied
his dispatch from army headquarters and forwarded it to Hill. Hill received the order in his
brother-in-law’s handwriting; this was the copy that he and his family would later take pains
to preserve. On September 13th, after the Confederates moved out of Frederick, McClellan’s
army reached the city and encamped in many of the same spots that Lee’s troops had
occupied days before. It was on this day that Union Corporal Barton Mitchell and First
Sergeant John Bloss discovered an unmarked envelope on the ground. Inside was a piece of
paper wrapped around three cigars. The top of the paper included the name of Lee’s
headquarters and was labeled “Special Orders No 191,” and at the bottom was addressed to
“Maj Gen D.H. Hill Comdg Division.”21
The soldiers forwarded this important piece of intelligence through their chain of
command to McClellan’s headquarters, where an officer with some acquaintance with
Chilton recognized the adjutant general’s signature on the paper. Convinced he had a
genuine document on his hands, McClellan exultantly transmitted the news to Washington.
21 Stephen W. Sears, “The Twisted Tale of the Lost Order”, North and South 5, Issue 7 (2002): 54. Sears’
article is one of the most recent accounts about the finding of the Lost Order. Despite later Confederate claims
and accusations against Hill dropping the order or leaving it on a table, the story of how Barton and Bloss found
the paper in a field is the currently accepted one. Northern controversy on the subject deals with Bloss’ efforts
to eclipse Barton (who died a few years after the war) as the one who found the document, how McClellan
responded (or not depending on point of view) to the intelligence, and what happened to the cigars.
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As it turned out, he did little to press his advantage; among other issues, S.O. 191 led him to
believe that he faced both Longstreet’s and Hill’s units at South Mountain, which lay
between Frederick and Hagerstown. In reality, only Hill with his five thousand men
occupied the main pass through the mountain, and, largely unassisted for most of the day, he
held off Federal troops on the 14th. Nonetheless, Union actions made Lee consolidate his
troops more quickly and withdraw to Sharpsburg, Maryland, where McClellan met him on
September 17th for the Battle of Antietam.
Whether or not Lee or any of the Confederate generals found out about the loss of the
order during the Maryland Campaign is still a matter of debate, but someone leaked
McClellan’s find to Northern newspapers by September 15th, two days after its discovery.22
The following March, McClellan testified before the (U.S.) Congressional Joint Committee
on the Conduct of the War that the discovered dispatch was addressed to D.H. Hill, and
information about the hearing eventually reached the Confederate press. The Savannah
Republican conjectured on June 4, 1863, that Hill must have dropped the dispatch in his tent
before moving out to South Mountain. McClellan’s movements now made sense, and Lee
lost the opportunity to consolidate and ready his forces for battle. “We can never know what
would have been the result if that order had not fallen into the hands of the enemy,”
correspondent “P.W.A.” wrote, “and yet it is not impossible, had it not reached the Federal
general, that we should this day be in Maryland.”23 Getting wind of the media coverage, Hill
22 Articles on the finding of the order appeared in the New York Herald (Sept 15th), Washington Star (Sept 15th),
Baltimore Sun (Sept 16th), and Baltimore American (Sept 17th): Scott M. Sherlock, “The Lost Order and the
Press,” Civil War Regiments 6, No. 2 (1998): 174-76. Concerning when Lee found out his order was
compromised, Douglas S. Freeman and James Murfin believe he already knew the night of September 13th,
while Stephen Sears thinks Lee’s postwar memory was clouded by the publicity the loss received in 1863, and
that he did not know until he read about McClellan’s testimony.
23
“Army Correspondence,” Savannah Republican, June 4, 1863.
17
immediately sensed that his military reputation might suffer injury over the incident. As a
precaution, he sent his field papers, including the order in Jackson’s hand, to his wife Isabella
for safekeeping. “Fearing that there might be a stain upon my memory, if I fell in the
approaching battle [Chickamauga] without some explanation of the mystery,” Hill stated in
1868, “I wrote home that the copy of Lee’s order, which governed me in all I did while in
Maryland, could be found among my papers. . .”24
24 Hill, “The Lost Dispatch,” 275. Jackson of course was dead by the summer of 1863 and could not back up
his brother-in-law’s statements.
CHAPTER 4
A BARREN VICTORY: CHICKAMAUGA
Little did Hill know that the upcoming campaign would prove more immediately
problematic to his reputation. Jefferson Davis appointed Hill lieutenant general (pending
approval by the Senate) in July 1863 and sent him from Virginia to corps command in the
western theater. When Hill joined Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, the army was
struggling through a hot summer in the Chattanooga area after Union Major General William
Rosecrans forced it out of Tullahoma, Tennessee the month before. Fighting a high desertion
rate, the army was also in the midst of a command upheaval, with several of Bragg’s
subordinates openly expressing no confidence in his abilities.25 Hill had known Bragg since
the Mexican War, but soon found himself agreeing with other officers that the commanding
general was prone to indecision and had a habit of blaming subordinates for all battlefield
failures. Nevertheless, a combination of favorable terrain and Rosecrans’ miscalculations
provided Bragg with a chance to defeat the Yankees in the Georgia valleys south of
Chattanooga, particularly along the course of Chickamauga Creek.
For the first three weeks of September, the two armies jockeyed for control of the
valleys and the supply route to Atlanta. At McLemore’s Cove between September 9th and
25 Peter Cozzens, This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992),
4, 18-20, 27; Judith Lee Hallock, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat, Vol. II (Tuscaloosa: The University
of Alabama Press, 1991), 7-9, 13-26, 30-32; Thomas L. Connelly, Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee,
1862-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 69-73, 121-134. These books provide some
of the best summaries of the Chickamauga campaign and leadership issues in the Army of Tennessee, from
which I construct the following narrative.
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10th, Hill made the decision not to attack an isolated Federal unit in the Chickamauga valley.
Bragg accepted his reasons at the time and followed up with a plan for his other corps
commander, Leonidas Polk, to attack Union troops further downstream. This movement did
not go off as planned either, and by the 19th the armies had shifted north again and faced each
other across the Chickamauga. Bragg had lost his opportunity to surprise Rosecrans, but he
also gained reinforcements in the form of General James Longstreet’s corps, newly arrived
from Virginia. He reorganized his army the night of the 19th, placing Polk in command on
the right (north) and Longstreet on the left (south) of the Confederate battle line. Hill, as the
junior lieutenant general on the field, was subordinate to Polk, but his troops occupied the
northernmost portion of the line and were responsible for starting the attack the following
morning. Due to several poor decisions by Bragg, Polk, Hill, and their staff officers and
couriers, as well as darkness, fog, and the confusion of the battlefield, Hill never received
word that he was to engage the enemy at sunrise.
The next morning, Bragg, puzzled as to the silence after sunrise, rode to Hill’s lines to
discover the troops eating breakfast and Polk nowhere in sight. Irate, he ordered Hill to
attack, which he did about an hour later, around 9:30 to 10:00 AM. Hill’s first division made
progress in flanking the Union lines but was beaten back, while his other division had an
even harder time with a full frontal assault through the woods. The rest of the Confederates
down the line engaged the Yankees, and Bragg’s big break came when enemy error allowed
Longstreet’s troops to force a gap in the Union lines and send Rosecrans and his soldiers
fleeing toward Chattanooga. By nightfall, the Army of Tennessee held the field and was
primed to follow the Union army toward the city. Considering the disorganized state of the
army and staying true to temperament, Bragg decided not to pursue Rosecrans.
20
On September 29, Bragg, dissatisfied with Polk’s explanation of the late attack on the
20th, suspended him for disobeying a direct order, and found another scapegoat for the
McLemore’s Cove debacle.26 Polk retreated to Atlanta where he wrote angry letters to
Jefferson Davis, while Longstreet penned letters of his own to Lee and Secretary of War
Seddon and met with Hill and other generals to decide what to do about Bragg. They
concocted a petition to Davis requesting the relief of Bragg from command for health
purposes, but in truth it was a vote of no confidence for his overall leadership ability.
Longstreet, Hill, Hill’s subordinate Patrick Cleburne, and several brigade commanders
signed the petition, but they never sent it to Richmond, as Davis decided to visit the army
that week.27 He called a meeting with the generals and asked them to voice their opinions
while Bragg incredibly sat in a corner of the room listening to the entire conversation. At the
end of it all, Davis decided to keep Bragg in command and sent Polk to another theater of
operations.28
While Davis was still in Georgia, Bragg wrote him to formally relieve Hill of corps
command. Through rumors and hearsay, Bragg may have believed Hill wrote the petition or
that it was mostly his idea, so this made Hill the perfect substitute for blame with Polk
leaving the army.29 “Possessing some high qualifications as a commander,” Bragg told
26 OR, 30 (2): 54-56 & 310.
27 Hal Bridges, Lee’s Maverick General: Daniel Harvey Hill (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991),
227-37; Cozzens, This Terrible Sound, 529-32; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 235-42.
28 OR, 30 (2): 68 & 70; Bridges, Lee’s Maverick General, 238-39; Cozzens, This Terrible Sound, 532-33;
Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 245-46. Davis had already decided to keep Bragg in command before the meeting,
so it is unclear why he held it. Few written accounts of the meeting remain other than Longstreet’s.
29 Bridges, Lee’s Maverick General, 234-37; Cozzens, This Terrible Sound, 531-32; Connelly, Autumn of Glory,
238-40. Connelly supports the widely accepted view that General Simon Buckner drew up the petition because
of the prominent placement of his signature. Hill always denied writing it, but because he ended up with the
petition at his headquarters (and in fact kept it after the war), drew Bragg’s suspicion.
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Davis, “he still fails to such an extent in others more essential that he weakens the morale and
military tone of his command. A want of prompt conformity to orders of great importance is
the immediate cause of this application.”30 Davis concurred with this rather vague letter, and
Bragg’s adjutant notified Hill on October 15 that he was thereby relieved and should report
with his staff to the Adjutant General in Richmond for further instructions.31
Hill was stunned, as were many of his peers and soldiers. Taking his adjutant,
Lieutenant Colonel Archer Anderson, with him, Hill went to Bragg’s headquarters to find out
why he was being dismissed. Anderson documented the conversation between the two
generals immediately after the meeting. 32 Bragg offered varying explanations every time
Hill asked a question. First he explained how he had asked Davis to remove Hill for “the
harmony and efficiency of the service,” and that he had no formal charge to file against his
subordinate.33 When Hill asked him what he meant by harmony and efficiency, Bragg
replied that he did not hold Hill to any military offense (like dereliction of duty), but there
had been orders that “had not been executed as they should have been,” such as at
McLemore’s Cove, although he did not hold this against Hill at the time.34 Rather, he felt he
did not have the “cordial cooperation” of Hill, due to previous reports he had received, and
that he could not command the army without the support of his subordinates.35 If Bragg was
30 OR, 30 (2): 148-49; Braxton Bragg to Jefferson Davis, 11 October 1863, Braxton Bragg Papers, 1833-1879,
MSS 2000 Microfilm Edition, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio.
31 OR, 30 (2): 149.
32 Statement of Archer Anderson, 16 October 1863, Daniel Harvey Hill Papers, North Carolina State Archives
(hereafter cited as Hill Papers, NCSA).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
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referring to the petition, Hill answered, “he had put his name to that paper with great
reluctance and as a matter of simple duty.” 36 Furthermore, he had never expressed want of
confidence in Bragg until the morning of the 20th, when the commanding general did not
personally appear on the field to reconnoiter the front and flanks, place cavalry or adjust the
lines. As for McLemore’s Cove, “nothing short of Almighty Power could have
accomplished what was required” on September 10.37 Hill charged that Bragg’s vague
statement about want of harmony and efficiency so soon after the battle would severely
damage his reputation, and asked for specific charges “in some plain, palpable shape” so that
he could defend himself.38 Bragg repeated that he would file no charges, and that he did not
hold Hill responsible for anything that occurred up the night of the 20th. When Hill asked for
this statement in writing, Bragg told him to apply through proper channels. Anderson added
that Hill also asked Bragg why he was singling him out from the other commanders, but that
he received no reply.39
Before he left Chattanooga, Hill collected statements from his staff members and
subordinate commanders concerning the battlefield issues of September 19th and 20th.40
Several of his peers also wrote letters of farewell and encouragement. His old friend
Alexander Stewart wrote with three other generals to express confidence in his corps
leadership. “I regard him as an active, intelligent, brave and competent officer, possessing
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Statement of Thaddeus Coleman; statement of Archer Anderson, Thaddeus Coleman, and George West; and
statement of CPT H.C. Semple, 13 October 1863; and statement of John C. Breckinridge, 16 October 1863, Hill
Papers, NCSA. The staff officer statements dated October 13, before his formal relief, suggest Hill was
concerned about the fallout of Polk’s suspension and had heard rumors he might be next.
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the confidence of this division, and I believe of the corps,” Stewart stated.41 John C.
Breckinridge, one of Hill’s division commanders, added in his own note, “I have had more
than one occasion to express my admiration of your fidelity to duty, your soldierly qualities
and your extraordinary courage on the field. It may gratify you to know the feelings of one
of your subordinates, and to be assured that in his opinion they are shared by his Division.”42
Turning the corps over to Breckinridge, Hill departed for Richmond, focused on clearing his
name. His main concern throughout was how odd his dismissal looked so soon after
Chickamauga, as if he had blundered greatly on the battlefield. Only eleven days after his
firing, the Charleston Courier published an article linking the inability of Bragg to pursue
Rosecrans’ army to the delay caused by Hill feeding his troops. Similar articles in the
Richmond Dispatch and the Raleigh Register addressed the same theme. By harping on the
timing of ration distribution, the authors also questioned Hill’s ability to properly care for his
men.43 Fully aware of at least the Charleston article and camp rumors, Hill deeply felt that
both sides of his reputation, concerning his military competence and honor, were on the line
and by extension his devotion to the South.
41 A.P. Stewart, J.C. Brown, B.R. Johnson and W.B. Bate to Hill, 15 October 1863, Hill Papers, NCSA.
42 John C. Breckinridge to D.H. Hill, 15 October 1863 (certified as true copy by M.A. Small on 12 March
1868), Hill Papers, NCSA.
43 OR, 30 (2): 152; Richmond Dispatch, 20 October 1863; Raleigh Register, 20 October 1863. The OR entry
reflects the Charleston Courier article, dated October 26 (1863), that Hill enclosed in correspondence to the
Confederate War Department.
CHAPTER 5
COMMENCE FIRING: THE WAR OF WORDS BEGINS
Hill applied to Samuel Cooper, the Confederate adjutant general, for a formal military
court of inquiry. While awaiting an answer, he had a contentious meeting with Davis in
November, and came away with the impression that his request for a court would be
denied.44 A couple of days later, Hill penned a letter to Davis that started out apologetic in
tone but turned into a passionate defense of his character. He said he had been singled out
for punishment when other generals had expressed the same want of confidence in Bragg.
“Justice should be even-handed,” he bluntly wrote.45 Then, Leonidas Polk received a
“complimentary letter” from Davis upon reinstatement to command, and was cleared of any
negligence on the morning of September 20, making it seem like only Hill was to blame in
the eyes of the president.46 A court was necessary to establish the facts. “There have been
many disgraceful surprises, defeats, surrenders & other disasters and the responsible officers
not held to account,” Hill said, and summed up, “at Chickamauga, there was a glorious
victory & all accord that I contributed my share in winning it and yet I am virtually
condemned for my connection with that great battle. Can this be just?”47
44 D.H. Hill to Samuel Cooper, 13 November 1863, Hill Papers, NCSA; Bridges, Lee’s Maverick General, 250-
51.
45 D.H. Hill to Jefferson Davis, 16 November 1863, Hill Papers, NCSA.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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Davis probably did not appreciate Hill’s tone and wanted to ignore the general
altogether, but in his response he assured him that he had taken no offense and considered
“the whole matter . . . restored to its official character.”48 He and Bragg seemed determined
to put the matter behind them; one historian suggested that they purposely “cleaned house” in
the Army of Tennessee that fall, moving regiments around to break up the Kentucky and
Tennessee opposition.49 The War Department turned down Hill’s application for a court of
inquiry, and he went back to Charlotte to wait for notification of a suitable position for his
rank.50 Two months later, a friend and fellow officer from the Army of Northern Virginia,
Lafayette McLaws, wrote that he had met with Bragg the day after Hill’s dismissal and asked
him for reasons. McLaws reported that Bragg said he had “the kindest feelings” for Hill but
that the two could not be in the same army.51 “You were, as you always are, open and
outspoken, made no secret of your opposition to him, and you were looked on as the head
and front of the coalition against Genl B,” McLaws reminded him.52 His words probably
soothed Hill little, since the press already labeled him as the general who had stopped the
battle to let his soldiers eat. McLaws, however, was right. Hill had spoken out publicly
against a superior officer when commiserating with his fellow generals after the battle, and
Bragg could not let this go unheeded. Davis and Bragg, however, unfairly singled out Hill
and made an example of him, compared to other generals who had been just as outspoken as
he, and were allowed to leave Chickamauga with reputations intact.
48 OR, 52, (2): 562.
49 Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 250-53. Officers from Tennessee and Kentucky resented Bragg’s withdrawal
from the two states (and subsequent Union occupation) over the course of 1863.
50 Samuel Cooper to D.H. Hill, 16 November and 20 November 1863, NCSA.
51 Lafayette McLaws to D.H. Hill, 23 January 1864, Hill Papers, NCSA.
52 Ibid.
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Hill did not give up without a fight, acting as his own reputational entrepreneur and
enlisting others to help him. During his downtime, he exploited kinship networks to try to
get a statement of confidence in his military abilities from Davis. He convinced his oldest
brother and father figure William to meet with Adjutant General Cooper and Davis to secure
a guarantee of endorsement for follow-on commands.53 He also applied to North Carolina
Senator William Graham, his wife Isabella’s uncle, who went one step farther and lobbied for
Hill’s reinstatement as lieutenant general. At this point, all Hill was looking for was a clear
record, not promotion, and some duty other than “Inspector General of Trenches” in
Petersburg, Virginia.
Hill corresponded with Graham throughout the spring of 1864 about the various
reasons the administration had given him for not being able to remain a lieutenant general.
He had been told there was no vacancy, corps command or otherwise, for him at that rank,
yet other officers had been promoted to that grade and given assignments. Hill had nothing
against these other generals; he had simply not been given a sufficient reason for being
passed over. Referring back to his November interview with Davis, Hill conjectured, “the
whole brunt of my offense is that . . . I made him angry by telling him that he had
discriminated between me & Genl Polk . . . For this, the President resolved to punish me,
wound my feelings, and degrade me in public estimation.”54 A week later, he thanked
Graham for his efforts on his behalf. Graham had evidently tried to place Hill back in Lee’s
army, but Hill felt better men than he deserved that honor. “All I wish is the vindication of
53 William Hill to Samuel Cooper, 25 March 1864, Hill Papers, NCSA; Bridges, Lee’s Maverick General, 255-
60 & 264-66.
54 D.H. Hill to William Graham, 27 May 1864, William A. Graham Papers, Southern Historical Collection,
Manuscripts Department, Wilson Library, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (hereafter cited as
Graham Papers, SHC).
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my past history,” he wrote, adding, “I can neither live nor die satisfied with a stain upon my
character. I would be content with a statement from Mr Davis that he had no fault to find
with me as a soldier & had refused to nominate me to the Senate out of personal pique.”55
Hill knew that Davis, as a former military man, understood the concept of honor and
the desire to appear courageous, competent, and forthright in front of soldiers. However, he
was naïve to think that Davis, given his aloof character and political troubles, would publicly
or even privately admit that he was wrong in any way. Both men, in fact, were too proud to
budge on the decisions that had brought them to this impasse. Hill, for example, maintained
that the War Department offered him a job in Charleston but had not ordered him to go; he
accepted the post on the condition that Davis or Secretary of War James Seddon gave his
brother or uncle the letter of confidence. In Richmond, his action was interpreted as
disinterest in any new command, because he had not formally reported to Charleston, which
made it hard for Graham to make any headway on Hill’s behalf.56 Hill then appealed to
Bragg, now working side by side with Davis in Richmond, for justice. Nevertheless, in
closing his missive, Hill asserted, “I must candidly tell you that I do not regret my course
whilst connected with the Army of Tennessee. I acted solely from a sense of duty and, with a
full knowledge of all the suffering attendant upon the act, would renew it again.”57
In the meantime, the family did not forget the matter of the Lost Dispatch. Isabella
Hill was concerned about the implications of the incident in the aftermath of the
Chickamauga affair. In a January 1864 letter to Graham, she relayed information “in regard
55 D.H. Hill to William Graham, 4 June 1864, Graham Papers, SHC.
56 Samuel Cooper to D.H. Hill, 16 February 1864, and James Seddon to Senator W.A. Graham, 6 June 1864,
Hill Papers, NCSA; D.H. Hill to William Graham, 13 June 1864, Graham Papers, SHC.
57 OR, 52 (2): 677.
28
to this order, said to be lost by him [Hill].” She reported that the order, “in our dear Brother
Jackson’s own handwriting,” was filed in Hill’s “most important papers” in their home. Mrs.
Hill sent a copy of this order to Graham along with a testimonial by a friend, saying “They
will show the absurdity of the whole affair & ought in justice to my Husband be published in
the Richmond papers.”58 With her name at stake as well, Isabella actively took steps to help
vindicate her husband.
By January 1865, nothing much had changed for Hill, who was back in the field (but
not in command) in Georgia. The War Department never sent the letter of confidence it had
guaranteed to his brother. He hoped that the Confederate Congress would address his case,
but held Davis responsible for his public humiliation. Writing again to Graham, Hill showed
how clearly both the Lost Dispatch and Chickamauga weighed on his mind:
Mr. Davis has done all that the Executive could to blacken my character & reputation.
I may fall any day in this bloody strife and my name go down to my children with the
Executive’s stain upon it. Is there no remedy? Congress can ask for my restoration
to rank or can demand the reasons of my degradation. This would cancel in public
estimation the wrong done through private spite. The myth about the Lost Dispatch is
but a specimen of the temper exhibited towards me.59
Soon Hill’s battle for his reputation was forgotten amidst the disintegration of the
Confederacy.
Throughout the previous year and a half, Hill received support from friends and
family for his plight, but did not obtain the acknowledgement he really wanted—an apology
and vote of confidence from Jefferson Davis. Frustrated by this failure and recurring health
problems, Hill felt rather useless the last few months of the war. His standing in the future
cultural archives of southern history was in jeopardy, and he agonized over public opinion.
58 Isabella Hill to William Graham, 5 January (1864), Hill Papers, NCSA.
59 D.H. Hill to William Graham, 30 January 1865, Graham Papers, SHC.
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Time would soften his opinion of the Confederate president, who became a southern martyr
for his stoicism during his postwar imprisonment at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Hill would soon
have other people to spar with over his reputation.
CHAPTER 6
CALLING FOR REINFORCEMENTS
Nothing further appears to have agitated Hill about his wartime reputation until
Edward Pollard’s book appeared in 1866, and as previously noted, Hill was not aware of the
accusations against him until 1868. Curiously, however, he published his official battle
report of Chickamauga, along with those of John C. Breckinridge and Patrick Cleburne (his
division commanders), in three of the first six issues of The Land We Love (LWL).60
Certainly Hill was trying to establish a readership base by showing what kinds of articles his
magazine would include, and to be sure, few outside authors submitted material to the
fledgling enterprise the first year of its existence. However, he never reprinted his other
battle reports, such as the one about South Mountain. The Official Records show that Hill’s
Chickamauga report did not get turned in to the Richmond authorities until August 1864,
when it was found in Leonidas Polk’s papers.61 In December 1864, Hill made reference in a
letter to William Graham about his report being suppressed, insinuating that Davis had
something to do with it.62 If Hill perceived mischief on the part of the president, he appears
to have made sure his report went public by including it in his magazine soon after the war.
60 Cleburne’s report appears first, in August 1866, followed by Breckinridge’s report in September and Hill’s in
October. The first issue of LWL was published in May 1866. For an explanation of the organization, content,
and purpose behind LWL, see Ray M. Atchison, “The Land We Love: A Southern Post-Bellum Magazine of
Agriculture, Literature, and Military History,” The North Carolina Historical Review 37, No. 4 (October 1960):
506-15.
61 OR, 30 (2): 147. Following the chain of command, Hill would have turned in his report to Polk after
Chickamauga (and before both were relieved of command). Polk died in early 1864 at Pine Mountain, Georgia.
62 D.H. Hill to William Graham, 7 December 1864, Graham Papers, SHC.
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In it he gave his timeline and version of events on September 20th, paying homage to the
efforts of Breckinridge and Cleburne and discreetly criticizing Polk for not committing
reserve forces. Both his subordinates’ reports backed up Hill; nobody could question
Cleburne, who was killed in 1864, and Breckinridge continued to support his former
commander by endorsing LWL. Not coincidentally, Davis was still in Federal prison at this
time, and would have been hard pressed to respond. With no introduction or additional
comment, Hill the editor cleverly placed the Chickamauga reports out for his readership to
receive and allowed them to draw their own conclusions about his professional conduct
during the campaign.
During the next year and a half, Hill left Chickamauga behind and diversified his
magazine’s topics, saving most of his criticism for current political policies. Compared to
many of his articles, which focused on literature and suggestions for regional agricultural and
industrial improvements, his February 1868 entry on the Lost Dispatch was full of anger and
sarcasm. Hill no doubt also had in mind that Pollard blamed him for the lost opportunity at
McLemore’s Cove and for not starting the battle on time along Chickamauga Creek.63 He
depicted himself as being forced to respond to Pollard, since the journalist spoke of “matters
of general and not merely of personal interest.”64 Hill argued that it was right that he should
have received S.O. 191 through Stonewall Jackson because he fell under his command, and
suggested that the copy from Robert E. Lee might have been lost at army headquarters,
dropped by the courier, or purposely lost through treachery.65 Hill also contended that the
loss of the dispatch was actually a good thing for the Army of Northern Virginia. Giving
63 Pollard, The Lost Cause, 448-50.
64 Hill, “The Lost Dispatch,” 273.
65 Ibid., 274-75.
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George McClellan the benefit of the doubt for possessing common sense, Hill argued that the
order merely communicated the fact that Lee had divided his army—a fact that Union
cavalry could have provided to its commander—and that it did not reveal information such as
the composition and strength of the forces. McClellan was led to believe by the letter of the
order, four days old at the time he read it, that James Longstreet, Hill, and perhaps even
Jackson opposed the Federal army at South Mountain, and assumed he faced a larger amount
of troops than Hill’s band of five thousand. If not for the order, Hill asserted, McClellan
“could have crushed my little squad in ten minutes” on September 14th, 1862.66 The order
led the Federal commander to commit an error in judgment that “saved Lee from destruction”
by permitting him to consolidate at Sharpsburg, and for better or worse, allowed the war to
continue for two more years.67
In his article, Hill mentioned receiving letters from fellow veterans who criticized
Pollard’s take on Confederate history. Additional supportive letters arrived after he
published his article in February 1868, which should have given Hill confidence that his
military peers approved of his action. One friend noted that he “read with pleasure your
article on the “Lost Dispatch” & other vagaries of Pollard the would be historian.”68
Agreeing with Hill that Pollard seemed to hold some sort of grudge against the general,
another friend added, “But for the pictures in his [Pollard’s] book, I should be strongly
tempted to consign it to the ignominious use to which has been devoted a large amount of the
66 Ibid., 277.
67 Ibid., 278. In his first after action report, written 15 October 1862, McClellan indicated that he moved his
main body up the National Road to Turner’s Gap, where Hill’s and presumably Longstreet’s troops were
located, mainly because it was the widest point to get his army across South Mountain (OR, 19 (1): 27).
68 J.T. Holtzclaw to D.H. Hill, 10 February 1868, Hill Papers, NCSA.
33
otherwise worthless trash of my library.”69 Later that year, former Virginia governor and
Confederate General Henry A. Wise wrote Hill in response to a letter inquiring if Wise had
endorsed The Lost Cause. “He [Pollard] requested my approval and I expressly refused to
sanction his utterly false & erroneous pretended history,” Wise answered. He disapproved of
all of Pollard’s books, and mentioned that General P.G.T. Beauregard, Hill’s commanding
officer for most of 1864, felt the same. Pollard, Wise concluded, was “an utterly abandoned
& shameless man & author, and writes for malice & for money.”70
Even southern newspapers picked up on the controversy. The Daily Journal of
Wilmington, North Carolina advertised the February edition of LWL, drawing “special
attention” to the Lost Dispatch article.71 The Galveston (Texas) Daily News summarized
Hill’s article, noting that the general “denies a charge which has been often published against
him all over the country, greatly to the damage of his reputation as a military officer.” The
paper concluded by telling its readers that they published the notice “in justice to a good man
and an able officer,” and referred them to the original piece in LWL.72
Letters from colleagues and newspaper endorsements did not necessarily convince
Hill that his name was cleared, for he wrote to a number of people between 1867 and 1869
trying to get information about how S.O. 191 was distributed and if his name was indeed on
the order. He contacted Robert Chilton and Charles Marshall, another staff officer of Lee’s,
and asked them about courier procedures at army headquarters. Chilton claimed “a very
defective memory” and said he could not remember the particulars of how headquarters
69 G. Wilson McPhail to D.H. Hill, 17 February 1868, Hill Papers, NCSA.
70 Henry A. Wise to D.H. Hill, 3 October 1868, Hill Papers, NCSA.
71 Wilmington Daily Journal, 5 February 1868.
72 Galveston Daily News, 5 March 1868.
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handled the dispatch. He stated that the standing orders for couriers delivering important
documents were “to bring back the envelope, receipted, or some written evidence of
delivery.” Chilton continued, “This order was so important, that violation of this rule would
have been noticed, & I think I should certainly recollect if delivery had been omitted in any
case.”73 Seven months later, Chilton again begged forgetfulness, regretting he could not aid
Hill more in his rebuttal against Pollard.74 Marshall recalled the talk at Lee’s headquarters
when McClellan’s congressional testimony was publicized, and stated that he, Chilton, and
others finally realized in 1863 that the copy of S.O. 191 addressed to Hill had been
compromised. Corroborating Chilton’s description of courier duties and document tracking,
Marshall said he did not know how the order was lost, but assured Hill, “Your simple
statement that you never saw it, puts an end to all conjecture as to the way you lost it.” He
suggested that Hill ignore Pollard and publish his own history of what happened in the
Maryland Campaign.75
Hill also approached Union veterans, including McClellan himself. In 1868, former
Federal commander S.W. Crawford wrote Hill that his and another officer’s impression at the
time was that they were occupying A.P. Hill’s former encampment in Frederick. They
seemed to assume that by virtue of location, the Lost Dispatch was addressed to A.P. Hill,
not D.H. Hill.76 McClellan, however, stated, “My remembrance has always been that the
order was addressed to you,” although, in contrast to his earlier testimony, he admitted it was
73 Robert H. Chilton to D.H. Hill, 22 June 1867, Hill Papers, NCSA.
74 Robert H. Chilton to D.H. Hill, 11 January 1868, D. H. Hill Papers, Library of Virginia (hereafter cited as
Hill Papers, LOV).
75 Charles Marshall to D.H. Hill, 11 November 1867, Hill Papers, LOV.
76 R.B. Marcy to S.W. Crawford, 17 August 1868, and S.W. Crawford to D.H. Hill, 22 August 1868, Hill
Papers, LOV.
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not impossible that he had made a mistake in his report. He promised to look through his
papers to see if he could find the Lost Dispatch and verify to whom it was addressed.77
Hill’s article struck a much different chord with the president of Washington
University in Lexington, Virginia, than with other veterans. Robert E. Lee read the February
1868 issue of LWL and quickly responded in a private letter to Hill concerning his assertion
about the benefits of the Lost Dispatch. He did not know what Pollard said about the matter,
but “at the time the order fell into Genl McClellans hands, I considered it a great calamity &
subsequent reflection has not caused me to change my opinion.”78 Lee pointed out that it
was proper that Hill should have received one copy of S.O. 191 from his headquarters as well
as one from Jackson’s, as the order changed the command structure by moving Hill from one
authority to the other. Far from mystifying and deceiving McClellan, the dispatch caused
him to issue orders to his subordinates to press toward the South Mountain gaps with the
intent of cutting off Confederate forces sitting on the heights above the Potomac River and
Harpers Ferry. Lee did not know how the order was lost, and did not know it was the copy
addressed to Hill until he read McClellan’s report, but he emphasized again at the end of his
letter that the incident was not a benefit “but on the contrary, ‘an injury’ to the Confederate
arms.”79
Known to have referred to Hill as a “croaker” during the Civil War, Lee probably did
not appreciate the liberties Hill took with an incident that compromised his plan to bring the
77 George McClellan to D.H. Hill, 1 February 1869, Hill Papers, LOV. McClellan wrote a follow-up letter to
Hill but I have not been able to locate it. It likely confirmed that Hill’s name was on the order. The Lost
Dispatch itself (with D.H. Hill’s name) resides in George McClellan’s papers in the Library of Congress.
78 Robert E. Lee to D.H. Hill, 21 February 1868, D.H. Hill Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Manuscripts
Department, Wilson Library, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (hereafter cited as Hill Papers,
SHC).
79 Ibid.
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hard hand of war to Yankee citizens.80 Lee also communicated his displeasure with Hill’s
assertion to Colonel William Allan and personal secretary E. C. Gordon, both of whom made
notes about their conversations with the general; Allen revealed his concurrence with Lee in
his posthumously published book on the Army of Northern Virginia in 1892.81 Although Lee
was not yet the preeminent icon of the Lost Cause and the contents of the letter remained
private, Hill took the criticism seriously. Despite other supportive letters, he persisted in
shoring up his reputation for posterity. The following month, Hill went so far as to get his
brother-in-law, Joseph Morrison, a former Jackson aide, to swear an affidavit before a judge
and make a notation on his copy of S.O. 191 that the dispatch was in Jackson’s
handwriting.82
As if Lee’s criticism was not enough, Pollard fired back at Hill in the New York
News, accusing the general of not providing him with personal information for his
publication of Confederate biographies, and evidently also made fun of Hill’s literary
pursuits. In the July 1868 issue of LWL, Hill answered, saying that he had no intention of
giving someone he professionally disapproved of information for another so-called history.
In fact, Hill alleged, Pollard was stealing his own character sketches of Confederate generals
out of LWL! “It is adding theft of property to attempted theft of character,” Hill
80 The croaking comment comes from the notes of William Allan, “Memda (Memorandum) of a conversation
with Gen. R. E. Lee, held Feb. 15 1868,” William Allan Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Manuscripts
Department, Wilson Library, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (hereafter cited as Allan Papers,
SHC).
81 Ibid.; also, E.C. Gordon, “Memorandum of a conversation held with Genl R. E. Lee at Washington College,
Lexington Va, 15 Feb 1868—In regard to the operations of the So. Army in Maryland preceeding [sic] the
battle of Sharpsburg and the ‘Lost Dispatch’,” Allan Papers, SHC, and Colonel William Allan, Stonewall
Jackson, Robert E. Lee, and the Army of Northern Virginia, 1862 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995). See pages
48-49 of this paper for Allan’s response to James Longstreet’s article on the Maryland Campaign in Century
Magazine.
82 Affidavit of Capt J.G. Morrison before the Mecklenburg County Court, North Carolina, 17 March 1868, and
“Copy by Genl Jackson his handwriting” of S.O. 191, Hill Papers, NCSA.
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complained.83 He returned to the matter of September 1862. “I deny that I threw down
Lee’s dispatch and demand the proof of an eye-witness,” Hill emphatically wrote.84
Reiterating his previous defense from February, he mentioned that Pollard’s latest slander
was “of misconduct, at Chickamauga. He knows that this is untrue.”85 Obviously tired of
dealing with the journalist, Hill stated that he would no longer pay attention to him, for “I
feel sure that he is harmless, however malignant,” and trusted that Americans would not
believe a man who “crept into a bomb-proof when the bullets began to fly.”86
Despite his written declaration that Pollard was harmless, Hill was clearly still
concerned about shaking any kind of doubt associated with his military reputation, even five
years after his firing at Chickamauga. Perhaps he felt this reputation was all he could count
on in the Reconstruction-era South—respect and recognition for one’s support of the late
Confederacy were just as or more important than financial stability, even with a wife and six
children to support. Pollard actually gave Hill the perfect excuse to reassert his outstanding
combat record to a sympathetic audience. Hill seized the opportunity to deflect criticism
from himself through an assertion about the outcome of the Maryland Campaign that,
compared to Pollard’s history, was more believable because it was spoken by someone who
was there. White southerners were too concerned with the problems of rebuilding their
society to tolerate Pollard’s penchant for muckraking, and they increasingly started to
appreciate the efforts of Jefferson Davis (recently released from prison) and military leaders
to save the Confederacy. That most of the responses to Hill’s article were sympathetic
83 D.H. Hill, “Editorial,” The Land We Love V, No. 3 (July 1868): 283.
84 Ibid., 284.
85 Ibid., 285.
86 Ibid.
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indicated that his tactics, whether out of mere indignation or ulterior motives, were
successful at least among former Confederate officers. From the lows of the Chickamauga
fallout four years earlier, Hill rebounded to facilitate his entry into the southern cultural
archives. He continued to receive compliments about and endorsements for LWL until he
turned it over to a Baltimore publishing firm in 1869.87 At this stage, Hill not only actively
salvaged his reputation; he was his own best reputational entrepreneur.
87 The Land We Love had up to twelve thousand subscribers, which was a large number compared to other
magazines during a period when most southerners could not afford to buy them. Hill’s own correspondence
indicates that it had many Northern readers: Atchison, “The Land We Love,” 508; Blight, Race and Reunion,
150-51; Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy, 50.
CHAPTER 7
DISSENTION IN THE RANKS
The turbulent political and economic events of the 1870s gave Hill plenty to write
about in his new publishing venture, The Southern Home, diverting his attention from a strict
focus on wartime events. As Rutherford B. Hayes’ election to the presidency (through the
Compromise of 1877) ushered in the end of Reconstruction and a spirit of national
reconciliation, more Americans became interested in reading about Civil War battles and
celebrating the veterans of the conflict. During this decade, as David Blight elegantly stated,
“Soldiers’ memory may have been more in a stage of incubation than hibernation—stored
and unsettled, more festering than sleeping, and growing into a cultural force.”88 Not
coincidentally, the Southern Historical Society Papers (SHSP) debuted in 1876, “at a time
when conservative white southerners were striving to reassert themselves both politically and
socially, and power relations in the South were in disarray.”89 As the first issue of the SHSP
attested to, former Confederates were ready and willing to impose their views on an
increasingly sympathetic white audience. As memory and reputational entrepreneurs in their
own right, the editors took on the responsibility of publishing articles “with the firm
88 Blight, Race and Reunion, 150.
89 Richard D. Starnes, “Forever Faithful: The Southern Historical Society and Confederate Historical Memory,”
Southern Cultures 2, No. 2 (Winter 1996): 177.
40
conviction that those who are interested in vindicating the truth of Confederate History will
sustain the enterprise and make it a complete success.”90
During the 1880s, the SHSP increasingly focused on contemporary commemorations
and “the relation of Confederate historical memory to current events,” but the journal also
continued to publish articles about wartime occurrences.91 It became the platform for
renewed public discussion of the Lost Dispatch and Chickamauga through battle reports and
reunion speeches. The SHSP republished Breckinridge’s report of Chickamauga in April
1879, followed four years later by those of Bragg, Longstreet, and Simon Buckner. In 1884
and 1885, the journal published nine more official reports, but Hill’s was not among them.
There could be many reasons for this, but Hill appears not to have cared, for none of the
reports criticized him. He was also preparing his own piece on the campaign for the Century,
and his former adjutant had already publicly complemented his commander.
The SHSP reprinted the keynote speech from each annual reunion of the Virginia
Division of the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) Association.92 In 1881, Archer Anderson,
who had transcribed Hill’s ill-fated interview with Braxton Bragg, delivered the annual
address on the “Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga.” Speaking extemporaneously,
Anderson invoked the language of chivalry to describe how Longstreet and the “romantic
presence” of his ANV troops rescued the Army of Tennessee. He brought attention to how
Hill had also come from the ANV, describing him as “a stern and dauntless soldier . . . whose
vigor, coolness and unconquerable pertinacity in fight had already stamped him as a leader of
90 Southern Historical Society Papers 1 (Jan 1876): 39.
91 Starnes, “Forever Faithful,” 189.
92 The names listed in the proceedings of the reunions can be compared to the membership of the SHS and show
many overlapping names, of which the most obvious is the first SHSP editor, Rev. J. William Jones.
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heroic temper.”93 In speaking of operations at McLemore’s Cove, Anderson laid the blame
fully on Bragg, saying he “frittered away a brilliant opportunity;” he mentioned no other
names in acknowledging the operation could have succeeded.94 Of the communications
issues of the morning of September 20, 1863, he was also vague, summing up the late start as
the product of “annoying miscarriages” that at least allowed the soldiers to get some food in
their empty stomachs.95 After complementing the élan of the troops at Chickamauga,
Anderson foreshadowed the troubles ahead, but spoke in a general tone about the
Confederacy, with no reference to the command fallout or additional comments about
Bragg’s leadership.
The audience received Anderson’s speech favorably, and it was not until a year and a
half later that one of Bragg’s former cavalry commanders sent a response to the SHSP taking
issue with the characterization of the commanding general. Former Confederate Major
General Will Martin provided more detail than Anderson about McLemore’s Cove, i.e. that
Bragg had relieved a subordinate for not attacking and implied that Hill could have helped
the situation.96 Aside from this article and another one generally critical of all the senior
commanders at Chickamauga, no one cast any sort of blame on Hill for the outcome of the
campaign.97 If Hill was concerned, it benefited him to keep quiet and let Bragg (deceased
since 1876) take the heat.
93 Col. Archer Anderson, “Annual Reunion of the Virginia Division A.N. Va. Association—Address of Col.
Archer Anderson on the Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga,” Southern Historical Society Papers 9
(September, 1881): 387 & 390 (hereafter cited as SHSP with volume number).
94 Ibid., 397.
95 Ibid., 410.
96 General W.T. Martin, “A Defence of General Bragg’s conduct at Chickamauga,” SHSP 11 (1883): 203.
97 Maj. W.W. Carnes, “Chickamauga,” SHSP 14 (1886): 398-407.
42
Things changed in 1884, when the SHSP published former Confederate General
Bradley T. Johnson’s “Address on the First Maryland Campaign,” the keynote address of that
year’s ANV Association Reunion. Johnson provided a narrative of both the Union and
Confederate actions in the fall of 1862. When he came to the Lost Dispatch, Johnson wrote:
General McClellan says this order fell into his hands. The Count of Paris states that it
was picked up from the corner of a table in the house, which had served as
headquarters to the Confederate General, D.H. Hill. A story current in Frederick is,
that General Hill sat for sometime at the corner of Market and Patrick streets
inspecting the march of his column as it moved by, and was observed to drop a paper
from his pocket, which was picked up as soon as he left, and delivered to McClellan
on his arrival on the 13th. It was a copy of Special Order No. 191, which had been
sent by Jackson to D.H. Hill, and was as follows:” (transcript of S.O. 191)98
Johnson referred to a history of the war written in 1876 by the Comte de Paris, who along
with many Europeans had traveled to the United States to observe the opposing armies
between 1861 and 1865.
Not surprisingly, Hill could not remain quiet about an incident he thought he had long
put to rest. A few months later, the SHSP published “The Lost Dispatch—Letter from
General D. H. Hill,” which was dated January 22, 1885 and addressed to the Reverend J.
William Jones, the secretary of the Society. After first observing that Johnson presented two
different theories of the loss of the order in the same paragraph, Hill reminded readers of his
exposé of Pollard seventeen years previously. His adjutant general, James W. Ratchford, had
certified that Hill’s headquarters never received S.O. 191 from Robert E. Lee. Furthermore,
Hill had occupied a tent, not a house, near Frederick. Hill then disputed Johnson’s claim that
the Confederates could have captured Washington and Baltimore and brought about
circumstances leading to peace and independence. Lee never mentioned this aim at all in his
98 General Bradley T. Johnson, “Address on the First Maryland Campaign,” SHSP 12 (1884): 519-20.
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reports, Hill argued—only that of holding on with the depleted Army of Northern Virginia
until it got too cold for the Federals to move into Virginia.99
“I have thought that McClellan lost rather than gained by the capture of order No.
191,” Hill continued, bringing up the claim that had so disturbed Lee in 1868.100 McClellan
and his commanders were quite simply misled by the number of rebel troops that were
supposed to be at South Mountain. “To assert that the Federals were not under some
delusion as to our numbers is to charge them with an imbecility unexampled in modern
warfare,” Hill declared, concluding, “This delusion could only have been caused by the
captured order.”101 The rest of his letter compared the Maryland Campaign with Gettysburg,
arguing that Lee had more troops the second time around and no lost dispatch to contend
with, yet the results were much worse. Very complimentary of Lee’s generalship and the
soldiers under his command, Hill took a swipe at Johnson by stating that Lee “did not look
round to find a scape-goat. . . Let all who admire his greatness imitate his noble example.”102
Once again, public questioning about his military reputation had put Hill on the
defensive. He was also perturbed at the popularity and influence of Virginia veterans in
particular. Ten years earlier, he had commented to William Graham, “I think that some
effort should be made to get a correct Confederate history of our State written. North
Carolina did the fighting & Virginia has written the history & from that history, it is difficult
99
“The Lost Dispatch—Letter from General D.H. Hill,” SHSP 13 (1885) 420-21. Lee states his purpose in his
report of the Maryland Campaign: OR, 19 (1): 144.
100 Ibid., 421.
101 Ibid., 422.
102 Ibid., 423.
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to discover that our State took any part in the Confederate struggle.”103 State bias aside, Hill
was correct in his assessment of the Virginia influence. His friend Jubal Early carefully
cultivated the image of Lee and Jackson as preeminent war commanders through his own
publications, speeches, and early involvement in the Southern Historical Society. He focused
discussion of the war on the eastern theater of operations, calling the defense of Richmond
the key to the Confederacy; it was no coincidence that the SHSP were published in that
city.104 Early and his fellow Virginians particularly criticized James Longstreet, the
Georgian who had served in both theaters of war but had the audacity to join the Republican
Party. Refusing to ascribe fault to Robert E. Lee, they cast about for someone to blame for
Confederate failure during the third day at Gettysburg, and found him in Longstreet, who had
not only allegedly disobeyed Lee’s orders, but had spoken out against his former
commander. Throughout the 1880s, the pages of the SHSP were full of articles and reports
about Gettysburg; to former Confederates, this was by far a more important debacle than
either the Lost Dispatch or Chickamauga. Debate over Gettysburg ensured that Longstreet,
unlike Hill, was eventually pushed out of the southern cultural archives by former colleagues
who feared he would taint Lee’s ascendance as the saint of Confederate warriors.105
Nevertheless, Hill found in Longstreet a sympathetic ear concerning the Virginia bias.
He started corresponding with Longstreet in 1884 about the facts of Chickamauga and the
103 D.H. Hill to William Graham, 28 April 1875, Graham Papers, SHC.
104 Gary W. Gallagher, “Jubal Early, the Lost Cause, and Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy,” in The Myth
of the Lost Cause and Civil War History, ed. Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2000), 40-43.
105 Connelly and Bellows, God and General Longstreet, 30-37; Jeffry D. Wert, “James Longstreet and the Lost
Cause,” The Myth of the Lost Cause, ed. Gallagher and Nolan, 129-32. For a monograph on Longstreet’s roles
in the Lost Cause, see William Garrett Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in
Southern History (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1987). These works also explain how
modern historians have treated Longstreet.
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Seven Days battles around Richmond in 1862. In February 1885, shortly after he wrote the
Reverend Jones, Hill addressed Longstreet about Bradley Johnson’s speech. “The Virginians
in order to glorify Lee assume that he would have conquered a peace, but for my
carelessness,” he complained bitterly.106 He was certain that he did not lose the order and
that the loss was beneficial to Lee. After spending a great deal of the letter providing
Longstreet with information for the article he was writing for the Century and promising
more to come, Hill wrote, “I confine myself today to the lost order, because I do hope that
you will set that matter right. The vanity of the Virginians has made them glorify their own
prowess & to deify Lee. They made me the scape-goat for Maryland and you for
Pennsylvania.”107 Hill continued in the same vein a few months later when he reported that
Jones had attacked Longstreet’s record in what was another effort at “the deification of Lee
by the Virginia people.”108
106 D.H. Hill to James Longstreet, 11 February 1885, James Longstreet Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and
Special Collections Library, Duke University (hereafter cited as Longstreet Papers, Duke).
107 Ibid.
108 D.H. Hill to James Longstreet, 21 May 1885, Longstreet Papers, Duke.
CHAPTER 8
BYPASSING OBSTACLES ON THE WAY TO NATIONAL REUNION
Hill may not have gotten along with some Virginia members of the Society, but that
did not keep him from contributing to the SHSP throughout the 1880s. In fact, he was the
keynote speaker at the ANV Association the year after Johnson, speaking on “The
Confederate Soldier in the Ranks.”109 In the meantime, the Century became a new outlet for
himself, Longstreet, and other veterans to spread their views outside the Virginia-dominated
publications to a national audience. Based out of New York City, the nationally-distributed
magazine invited former generals to contribute to the “Century War Series” for the purpose
of “interesting veterans in their own memories and of instructing the generation which has
grown up since the War for the Union.”110 Under the editorship of Robert Johnson and
Clarence Buel, the three year long series (November 1884-November 1887) published one
article from a Union veteran and one from a Confederate veteran in each issue, and in 1887
the editors compiled all of the entries into a four volume set entitled Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War. The series purposely avoided politics and promoted reconciliation through a
focus on “shared battle experiences,” and the authors liberally used reports from the newly
109 The Confederate Soldier in the Ranks: An Address by Major-General D. H. Hill of North Carolina, before
the Virginia Division of the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia (Richmond: Wm. Ellis Jones, Book
and Job Printer, 1885); also reprinted in SHSP 13 (1885): 259-77.
110
“Preface,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War I, ed. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (New
York: The Century Company, 1884-1887), ix (hereafter cited as Battles and Leaders with volume number). All
citations are from Battles and Leaders, with editors’ notes, and not the original Century magazine articles.
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compiled Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies to flesh out their
narratives.111
Hill wrote several articles for the series, one of the first being “The Battle of South
Mountain, or Boonsboro’,” published in May 1885. Hill may have been working on the
article for several months, depending on when the editors solicited input from him, but in
timing it was another rebuttal to Bradley Johnson. Hill alluded to the Lost Dispatch in the
opening sentence of his second paragraph when he stated that “The battle of South Mountain
was one of extraordinary illusions and delusions.”112 Following the format of other
narratives, he detailed the actions of September 14th, 1862 on the Union and Confederate
sides, with a tally of casualties at the end. In the middle of his article, however, he interposed
a one page discussion of the Lost Dispatch to explain “the extraordinary caution of the
Federals” that day.113 He reiterated how two decades previously he had proved that he did
not lose the order, as well as the old assertion that McClellan believed Longstreet to be closer
to South Mountain than he really was. The editors added notes at the bottom of the page
about a letter Hill sent to them reaffirming the chain of command through Jackson and the
affidavit of Hill’s adjutant general that Lee’s order was never received. Before moving back
to the main narrative, Hill forcefully stated, “The losing of the dispatch was the saving of
Lee’s army.”114
111 Ibid., ix-xi; Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy, 69-70.
112 Daniel H. Hill, “The Battle of South Mountain, or Boonsboro’: Fighting For Time At Turner’s and Fox’s
Gaps,” in Battles and Leaders II, 559.
113 Ibid., 569.
114 Ibid., 570.
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Besides sharing opinions with Longstreet, Hill wrote other people for information
about the loss of the order much as he had done in the 1860s. One acquaintance, Thomas
Moore, attempted to gather information for Hill from a family that lived near Frederick, but
with no success. Instead, he lavished praise on Hill for the South Mountain article, which
afforded him “genuine pleasure.”115 A month later, Longstreet informed Hill that he had
submitted his article about the Maryland Campaign to the Century, saying that he thought his
colleague would approve of his discussion of the dispatch.116
Hill’s article appears not to have garnered a specific response in the SHSP, but
Longstreet’s did when it was published a year later in 1886. Longstreet noted that the lost
order had been the subject of “much severe comment by Virginians who have written of the
war,” and backed Hill’s assertion that he was innocent of losing the document.117 He also
condoned Hill’s opinion that the dispatch had fooled McClellan at South Mountain.118
Colonel William Allan, one of Jackson’s staff officers and the same man to whom Lee had
complained about Hill’s 1868 “Lost Dispatch” piece, critically reviewed Longstreet’s article
for the SHSP. His main criticisms were over factual errors, but he also disapproved of the
alleged benefits of the Lost Dispatch. “After defending General D. H. Hill from some
imaginary assailant for the loss of the captured dispatch,” Allan wrote, “he [Longstreet]
adopts, more or less, General Hill’s idiosyncrasy in regard to the value of that dispatch to
McClellan and its effect upon the fortunes of the campaign.”119 Allan believed that Hill had
115 Thomas Moore to D.H. Hill, 3 June 1885, Hill Papers, LOV.
116 James Longstreet to D.H. Hill, 28 July 1885, Hill Papers, NCSA.
117 James Longstreet, “The Invasion of Maryland,” in Battles and Leaders II, 664.
118 Ibid., 665.
119 Col. William Allan, “First Maryland Campaign,” SHSP 14 (1886): 103.
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never received the order from Lee, but did not speculate on how it was lost, saying that there
was no way of finding out what happened at that point. Perhaps speaking for the Society as
well as himself, Allan added at the end, “We regret the tone in which General Longstreet
speaks of Virginians.”120
Longstreet could not escape criticism from Virginians even when the subject was
other than Gettysburg. He also did not aid his cause by taking a self-important tone in his
writings, something that would later cast doubt on his memoirs.121 Therefore, being
associated with Longstreet did not help Hill’s military reputation, although it does not appear
to have unduly damaged it either, for Hill could count on the other general to absorb most of
the blows from angry Virginians. Regardless of Longstreet’s intervention, Hill felt the need
to nip any controversy in the bud, even though Allan, as a representative of the Lee/Virginia
camp of Confederate veterans, had already accepted Hill’s explanation that he did not lose
the dispatch. Johnson may also have come around to this point of view or at least reconciled
with Hill, since he invited him to give a speech to veterans in Baltimore in 1887.122 One
possible explanation for Hill’s concern in 1884-1885 is that he was between jobs, having left
Arkansas after a major disagreement with the college trustees over matters of discipline.
Without attributing a feeling of paranoia to him, one can reasonably assume that D.H. Hill
may have felt like he was under siege. First, he was not able to impose the kind of control he
expected to wield as president of an institution of higher education; then, a general with an
120 Ibid., 106 & 118.
121 See Connelly and Bellows, God and General Longstreet, Chapter 1; also Longstreet’s memoir, From
Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1896).
122 On this occasion, Hill gave a speech titled “The Old South,” reprinted in SHSP 16 (1888): 423-43. Hill and
Johnson corresponded a few times in 1887 to exchange details about Hill’s Baltimore trip. There is no hint of
rancor in Hill’s side of the correspondence; see Bradley T. Johnson Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special
Collections Library, Duke University
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average war record brought up an old controversy that Hill thought he had settled years
before. He perceived his place in the southern cultural archives and as a spokesman for the
South to be in danger.
In addition to entries on South Mountain and the Seven Days Battles, Hill also wrote
a long article on Chickamauga for the Century. Told in the first person, it described Hill’s
impression of Bragg throughout the campaign and quoted extensively from official reports.
Like his adjutant a few years earlier, Hill blamed Bragg for the failure to attack Federal
troops in McLemore’s Cove. The main trouble with the commanding general, he claimed,
was “first, lack of knowledge of the situation; second, lack of personal supervision of the
execution of his orders.”123 Hill completely skipped over his actions during the two day
period. By contrast, he described in detail his attempts to link up with Bragg and Leonidas
Polk the night before the big battle, saying the first time he physically saw Polk’s order to
attack was in the SHSP nineteen years later. Aside from the feeding of the troops, Hill
continued, the army was not ready to attack in the morning because Bragg had not performed
his own reconnaissance to fix unit location issues, or to see the exact disposition of the Union
forces to the front.124 Hill spent most of the narrative complimenting all the soldiers involved
for their gallantry in battle. In conclusion, he remarked, “Whatever blunders each of us in
authority committed before the battles of the 19th and 20th, and during their progress, the
great blunder of all was that of not pursuing the enemy on the 21st.”125
123 Daniel H. Hill, “Chickamauga—The Great Battle of the West,” in Battles and Leaders III, 641-42.
124 Ibid., 653.
125 Ibid., 662.
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Hill did not mention anything about his quarrel with Bragg or Jefferson Davis,
preferring to end his account with a tribute to the soldiers. If he had, he would have drawn
renewed attention to the controversy over his reputation. Through a national medium outside
the control of the Virginia clique, Hill forwarded his own version of Chickamauga, one that
was factually accurate if not complete. Nevertheless, the narrative provoked an angry
editorial claiming that Hill blamed Bragg for the course of the battle because he wanted his
job. To this Hill replied, “I never once thought of a thing so absurd as becoming Gen
Bragg’s successor. Nor did any one ever hear me say one word derogatory of Gen Bragg
until after “the barren victory” of Chickamauga . . . All that I did was open & above board
from an imperative sense of duty & with not the remotest idea of self-aggrandisement
(sic).”126
By defending himself through the SHSP and Century articles, Hill reasserted his
innocence not only to Confederate veterans, but to a national audience. He established
himself as a leading spokesman for the Lost Cause while simultaneously defending his own
reputation. However, he very nearly damaged his military reputation in the long run. For
people like William Allan, who championed the memory of Lee and the Army of Northern
Virginia in the 1880s, the possibility that the Lost Dispatch did some good for the
Confederates diminished the valor of the troops who had fought tooth and nail against the
Federal army in Maryland. Many agreed that Hill and his troops had performed gallantly at
South Mountain, buying time for Stonewall Jackson and the other divisions of the army to
take Harpers Ferry and regroup at Sharpsburg. Ironically, though, Hill very nearly negated
his unit’s accomplishment by stating that the soldiers could have been swept off the mountain
by the Yankee hordes had McClellan not known about S.O. 191. In this sense, Hill did not
126 D.H. Hill to Editor of Picayune, 18 August 1887, Hill Papers, NCSA (emphasis mine).
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realize how this part of his dispatch story ran counter to the mainstream memory of soldierly
courage and sacrifice, a narrative he otherwise fully supported through his writings and
speeches. A man intensely committed to his soldiers, Hill was able to believe that when he
defended himself, he was defending them as well, in his role as a representative of the noble
southern cause that defended hearth and home. He saw no conflict between what he
advocated in terms of the tactical and operational advantages of the Lost Dispatch with the
avoidable casualties of South Mountain. Hill fully subscribed to the linkage of masculine
courage on the battlefield with honor, and most obviously, its reception in terms of
reputation.127 This aspect both justified his pride in his soldiers’ performance and blinded
him to the implications of his argument.
Hill’s counterfactual scenario was not unrealistic, except in perhaps overestimating
McClellan’s ability to act forcefully against an enemy whose numbers he tended to inflate.
The point was that Confederate veterans did not see any use in dragging up “might have
beens” when the nation was basking in the reconciliationist glow of the 1880s. A northern
friend even warned Hill about discussing controversial topics in the newspapers. Colonel
T.T.S. Laidley, who periodically looked in on Hill’s physician son Randolph in New York
City, wrote the general, “The mass of the Northern people do not expect you to regret your
action in the war, but they do think that it is better not to be always discussing the issues
which are past and forever settled.”128 Perhaps Hill took his advice, for his Century article on
Chickamauga was more ambivalent in tone. Even so, he got away with criticizing Bragg
more than he might have in the pages of the SHSP, which Bragg had helped found along with
127 Wyatt-Brown, The Shaping of Southern Culture, 209.
128 Col. T.T.S. Laidley to D.H. Hill, 22 May 1885, Hill Papers, NCSA.
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the society itself.129 Hill’s correspondence with Longstreet also dropped off, for he started to
resent the other general taking more credit for battlefield successes, especially the Virginia
campaigns of Summer 1862.130 Hill realized that Longstreet was no longer a viable
reputational entrepreneur for him.
During the last three years of his life, school duties and failing health prevented Hill
from contributing much more to the public discussion of the Civil War. North Carolina
newspapers marked Hill’s passing on September 24, 1889 with obituaries that outlined the
basic details of his military, educational, and publishing careers while lauding his Christian
virtues and courage under fire. The Charlotte Chronicle associated his last day alive with the
storm brewing over the city that day, noting that Hill died just as the clouds parted and the
sun came out. The paper spent more lines describing his Mexican War record than his Civil
War record, but did say that he had single handedly held back McClellan at South Mountain
and “was sent to help Bragg” at Chickamauga, engaging in “the stubbornest fighting of the
war.”131 Endorsing the memorial in the Charlotte Chronicle, the Raleigh News and Observer
expressed, in keeping with the times, its “personal appreciation of his sterling virtues, his
robust patriotism, his high character and his splendid bravery.”132 At the beginning of a
speech later printed in the SHSP, Charles C. Jones, Jr. memorialized recently deceased
Confederates and referred to Hill as “an uncompromising defender of the impulses and acts
129 Hallock, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat, 264.
130 D.H. Hill to Joseph Hill, 12 June 1886, Hill Papers, NCSA.
131 Charlotte Chronicle, Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1889.
132 Raleigh News and Observer, Thursday, Sept. 26, 1889.
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of the South,” and also as “a brave soldier, capable educator and Christian gentleman.”133
The obituaries, by not mentioning controversy, swept aside questions of Hill’s military
competence to focus on his character and role in forwarding Lost Cause interpretations of the
war.
133 Col. Charles C Jones, Jr., “The Siege and Evacuation of Savannah, Georgia, in December, 1864,” SHSP 18
(1890): 61.
CONCLUSION: MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?
So where does all of this leave Hill’s reputation? To review, he identified both the
military and character sides of his reputation as being at stake. Hill understood his military
competence and character to be linked—an insult against one was an insult against the other.
Accusations against him regarding the Lost Dispatch and Chickamauga catapulted him into
action to defend his good name and by extension the efforts of his soldiers. Hill first used his
family to help him secure concessions from the Confederate government, in particular a
statement of confidence from Jefferson Davis that would serve the purpose of affirming his
skills as a warrior. He did not feel he could be an effective general in the eyes of his soldiers
and the public if he did not have this statement. Hill and his allies might have succeeded in
getting him a new command and even reinstating his lieutenant general rank if not for his and
Jefferson Davis’ pride, and the impending Confederate loss. He ended the war unsure of his
place in history, with a sense of personal defeat more acute than many white southerners
because his perceived degradation occurred under the watchful eye of actual and armchair
generals.
Nevertheless, Hill still had enough clout to establish a literary magazine, The Land
We Love, in 1866, and it attracted subscribers across the newly reunited country. For the
next three years, Hill was his own best reputational entrepreneur via his scathing editorials
and clever insertions of dispassionate and commendable battle reports, published when his
perceived nemesis, Davis, could say nothing against him. The magazine gradually acquired
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legitimacy with former Confederates, giving Hill a strong foothold in the slowly blossoming
Lost Cause movement. In conjunction with The Land We Love, outside reputational
entrepreneurs supported Hill against a prominent memory-maker, Edward Pollard, during an
era in which those with wartime experience carried authority over those trying to rile up an
already agitated white public dealing with the perceived inequities of Reconstruction. By the
end of the decade, Hill had satisfied the public as to his innocence in regard to the
controversies, yet he privately retained doubts, perhaps aggravated by Robert E. Lee’s
disapproval of his argument about the usefulness of the Lost Dispatch.
Starting in the 1870s and gathering force throughout the 1880s, Virginia veterans
subsumed alternative narratives of the war under their construction of the Lost Cause and its
focus on Lee and the gallant soldiers. In this environment, Hill’s insistence that the Lost
Dispatch was a beneficial occurrence came close to damaging his overall reputation.
Harkening back to the Langs’ theory of recognition and renown, this is an example of how
someone’s symbolic linkage with a particular political or cultural identity influences what
reputation appears before the public. In Hill’s case, his publicly known outrage against
Reconstruction and his continued devotion to the Lost Cause, despite his “slipup” over the
lost order’s helpfulness, sealed his sterling character reputation and made his controversial
military opinion easier to tolerate. His decision to tone down his writings and disassociate
himself from “pariahs” like Longstreet also helped deflect criticism away from his strongest
assertions. Insiders (family, friends and peers) accorded Hill recognition and a degree of
renown for his character and devotion to the South through his inclusion in veteran
organizations, invitations to deliver speeches, and laudatory eulogies upon his death.
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Hill occupied a particular niche within the discourse of the Lost Cause as both a
proponent and target of collective and historical memory. Starting from its earliest
manifestations, the Lost Cause had always worked to exclude certain individuals such as
Pollard who deviated from the prevailing interest, and this tendency increased after Lee’s
passing and deification by the Virginians. Consequently, studying the nuances of the Lost
Cause myth and historical memory of the South reveals how someone like Hill could support
the myth while himself being supported by and at certain times criticized by it. The study of
individuals such as Hill provides new angles from which to evaluate the trajectory and
staying power of Lost Cause ideology. It may in fact be useful to think of the Lost Cause,
and southern historical memory, as changing and contested constructs in a similar fashion to
race, gender, or class. As Edward Harcourt showed in his study of the executed Confederate
scout Sam Davis, even the reputations of minor figures develop and change over time; in
Davis’ case, the editor of Confederate Veteran became interested in his story and made him
into a powerful symbol of the Lost Cause, one that still carries weight among white
Tennesseans but simultaneously draws different responses from African-American
Tennesseans.134
The case of D.H. Hill also illustrates the connections between individual and
collective memory as centered on traumatic experiences. Hill was traumatized not so much
by war and his individual experience in battle, but by the negative perceptions of his
involvement and actions. He brought his belief in the importance of reputation, and by
extension honor, from his pre-Civil War acculturation as a martial southern male. Hill
adjusted in the postwar climate to attacks on his reputation by becoming actively involved in
134 Edward John Harcourt, “’The Boys Will Have to Fight the Battles without Me’: The Making of Sam Davis,
‘Boy Hero of the Confederacy,’” Southern Cultures 12, No. 3 (Fall 2006): 29-54.
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crafting the historical memory of the war. He may never have fully understood how his
relatively simple statement about the helpfulness of the Lost Dispatch to the Confederacy
endangered the very reputation and Cause he strove to uphold. However, he was entirely
cognizant of his position as a Southern man defending not only his personal honor but that of
his chosen nation, the Confederacy.135 This study hopes to add to the growing literature on
southern historical memory by highlighting how veterans rearticulated and justified the
importance of reputation and honor through the civil religion of the Lost Cause. Reputation
and particularly honor, as Bertram Wyatt-Brown has acknowledged since his definitive study
of the subject, have “a broken, not a steady history.”136
After his death, Hill’s character remained unquestioned, but interested parties
engaged in ambivalent discussion about his military reputation, specifically in regard to S.O.
191. The few public statements his immediate family made were short, yet slightly
defensive, and privately they expressed relief that the proof of innocence rested in Hill’s
papers, later deposited in the North Carolina State Archives.137 No truly dedicated
reputational entrepreneur stepped forth to argue for Hill. Historians’ narratives of the
Maryland Campaign inevitably brought him up when they talked about McClellan’s
spectacular intelligence coup in Frederick, Maryland. He was the good but difficult general,
and association with the Lost Dispatch could fairly or unfairly reinforce the thorny aspect of
135 What further complicates this picture is that Hill was for a time a proponent of New South ideas.
Immediately after the Civil War he wrote about what the former Confederacy needed to do to encourage more
scientific education, industrial development and improve agricultural techniques (the last remained a focus
throughout his life). He regressed back to a defense of the Old South as he became disenchanted with
Reconstruction.
136 Wyatt-Brown, The Shaping of Southern Culture, 301.
137 See for example Eugenia Hill Arnold to Charles Dabney, 10 October 1931, Hill Papers, SHC, and the
following footnote about Isabel Arnold.
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Hill’s personality. On the other hand, historians have liberally quoted his Century article on
Chickamauga for evidence of Bragg’s erratic behavior and an overall description of the
battle, an irony Hill no doubt would enjoy. Hill will always be associated with controversy
because his name is printed on an important piece of paper that just happens to be the subject
of a one hundred forty-four year old mystery. Because of this, one may still come away with
a kernel of doubt about Hill’s military reputation, which is reinforced as long as people
discuss the Lost Dispatch.
In 1970, Isabel Arnold, aged ninety-two, wrote down several statements regarding
information about her Carolinian ancestors, including grandfather D.H. Hill. Echoing other
relatives, she remarked that she was “glad to say the lost dispatch is in safe keeping in
Raleigh, N.C.”138 Today, researchers access a photocopy of S.O. 191 in Hill’s papers while
the State Archives preserves the original in its vault. Ironically, this document is probably
preserved very carefully not so much for Hill’s sake but because it is in Stonewall Jackson’s
handwriting and would be prized by unscrupulous collectors. In addition, no one has yet
pointed out that the existence of this copy of the order does not prove that Hill never received
the one from Lee’s headquarters. This was Hill’s contention until his dying day, and most
people believed him. Through the power of his pen, Hill did a remarkably good job of
defending his reputation, but he still left room for historians and non-academics to debate his
importance in Civil War history and southern historical memory.
138 Isabel Arnold notes, 6 January 1970, Isabel Arnold Collection, Russell-Arnold Archives, Presbyterian
College. Ms. Arnold handwrote her observations, which were transcribed twice into a typewritten statement to
the United Daughters of the Confederacy. I cite one of the typed statements above, which is in a complete
sentence with correct spelling.
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